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Late Disclosure of Insider Trades: Who Does It and Why? 
Abstract 
We attempt to understand the personal incentives that motivate corporate insiders to engage in unethical 
behavior such as delayed trade disclosure. Delayed disclosure affects corporate transparency and other 
shareholders in the firm potentially suffer investment losses because they are unaware of insiders' 
activities. Using archival data from the 300 largest Australian firms between 2007 and 2011, the results 
show that risk factors such as insider age and tenure and wealth effects in the form of insider 
shareholdings affect the likelihood of delayed reporting. Governance positions such as committee 
membership mitigate this behavior. Our study highlights the importance of considering individual insider's 
wealth and risk factors. The self-monitoring role of governance positions is also indicative of the 
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Late disclosure of insider trades – who does it and why? 
 
1.  Introduction 
To avert compromising market integrity and investor confidence and to reduce the extraction 
of excessive private benefits by informed parties, regulations are implemented that require 
timely disclosure by corporate insiders when trading in their own firms’ shares. In Australia 
for example, for firms listed on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX), Listing Rule 3.1 
requires directors (corporate insiders) to disclose any changes in their stockholdings 
within five business days of the transaction. Public disclosure of insider trades accelerates 
price discovery and reduces insider profits (Huddart, Hughes and Levine, 2001) and these 
findings have been shown empirically where returns to trades disclosed immediately are 
lower than for delayed disclosed trades (Etebari, Tourani-Rad and Gilbert, 2004). There is 
also some evidence that the requirement to disclose may not be strictly adhered to in some 
Australian firms. For example, reviews done by the ASX Markets Supervision (ASXMS) of 
Directors’ Interest Notices show incompleteness or late disclosure rates of 5.2%, 7.3% and 
8.1% during the first quarter of 2010, first quarter of 2009 and third quarter of 2009 
respectively.  
 
We investigate small though persistent late disclosures of insider trades to initially, identify 
incentives for such behavior by corporate insiders and then to determine whether firm 
governance mechanisms mitigate the behavior. We use the extended fraud framework which 
states that the likelihood of fraud increases when a person has an incentive to commit fraud, 
an opportunity to do so because of weak controls or monitoring, the fraudulent behavior can 
be rationalized and the person has the capability to commit fraud (Wolfe and Hermanson, 
2004). Corporate insiders have incentives to delay the reporting of their trades when there are 




the opportunity with weak or ineffective firm monitoring of disclosure. Insiders may be able 
to rationalize this behavior as compensation for their efforts in managing the firm or because 
of excessive trading restrictions placed on them by the firm. Finally, all insiders have the 
capability to undertake such behavior as long as they hold stock in the firm. In this study, we 
pay particular attention to the incentives and the opportunity for delayed reporting because we 
are unable to determine the attitude to this behavior like Beams, Brown and Killough (2003) 
who identify determinants of intention to trade on inside information. Terpstra Reyes and 
Bokor (1991) also propose that ethical decisions with respect to insider trading depend on 
complex interactions between the person and the situation. They highlight person factors to 
include locus of control and interpersonal competitiveness and situation factors such as 
legality, referent others and potential profit. Because we are unable to obtain data on such 
person factors or attitudes (Beams et al. 2003), we rely on insider characteristics to assess 
their effects on the likelihood of late reported trading.  
 
Our main focus from an ethical viewpoint is on the insider’s decision to delay the reporting of 
trades, in contravention of the timely disclosure requirement. Put another way, the unethical 
behavior surrounds the late disclosure of the trades rather than the trading itself. This is 
because corporate insiders are allowed to trade as long as these trades are not trading based on 
non-public information. However, they have an obligation to provide timely disclosure of 
such activity. The requirement to provide timely disclosure when changes in interest occur is 
critical for the maintenance of corporate transparency and investor confidence. The decision 
to delay the reporting of trades reduces the transparency of management’s actions, allowing 
an opportunity to earn additional profits. That is, insiders with informational advantage have 
an opportunity to extract private benefits from the parties who have given them the 





A frequently held view is that insider trading is always illegal and unethical. However, 
McGee (2009) argues that this is not always the case and suggests its examination from the 
basis of two philosophical approaches: the utilitarianism approach and the rights based 
approach. The former views insider trading as ethical if it produces the greatest good for the 
greatest number. Delayed reported trades can be viewed as unethical because they only 
benefit the insiders who conduct them. These insiders are also in breach of their fiduciary 
duty and the requirement to report their trades in a timely manner. With the rights-based 
approach, insider trading is illegal if someone’s rights are violated. The rights of other 
shareholders in the firm to be informed of insiders’ trading activity and transparency are also 
violated with late reported trading. Therefore, we believe that this behavior contravenes the 
requirement to disclose trades on a timely basis and unethical from both the utilitarian and 
rights based approaches (for example McGee, 2009) where other shareholders potentially 
suffer losses when insider trading activity is not disclosed when it occurs, such that insiders 
profit more from these trades.  
 
It is crucial for investors to possess up to date information on insider stockholdings to 
comprehend the nature of the change in holdings and the signals accompanying the change. It 
is widely accepted that corporate insiders have intimate knowledge of the operations of a firm 
and possess superior information of its future performance and value. This informational 
advantage equips them with the ability to earn abnormal returns when they trade in their own 
firm’s shares (Givoly and Palmon 1985; Seyhun 1988). Becker’s (1968) economic rationality 
framework argues that for a crime to be committed, the benefits of doing so should outweigh 
its costs. The benefits from delayed reported trading are expected to be financial such as 




expected costs on the other hand are in the form of prosecution and loss of reputation. Prior 
research also contends that a manager whose wealth is linked to a firm’s stock price has a 
greater incentive to engage in financial misreporting (Cheng and Warfield, 2005; Bergstresser 
and Philippon, 2006). Steen and Horrigan (1995) also show that in failed firms, while insiders 
do not reduce their shareholdings, they do not increase them either. As not all insiders in the 
firm engage in late reporting, we attempt to identify wealth and individual characteristics 
influencing such behavior. Some studies propose that ethical decisions and behaviors are a 
function of the interactions between individual factors and situational factors (Trevino, 1986; 
Bommer, Gratto, Gravander and Tuttle, 1987). Terpstra, Rozell and Robinson (1993) found 
that men and also individuals who were highly competitive, younger and with an external 
locus of control are more likely to engage in insider trading. Guilt, anticipated gains, cynicism 
and perceptions of fairness of law influence the intention to trade on inside information 
(Beams, Brown and Killough, 2003). According to Bhattacharya and Marshall (2012), ‘richer’ 
top management tend to engage more in illegal insider trading activity. Specifically, we 
investigate whether an insider’s characteristics such as age, tenure within the firm and wealth 
linked to the firm in the form of equity based compensation and stockholdings affect the 
likelihood of late reporting. In addition, we test whether concerns about the effects of 
detection on their reputation mitigates such behavior. Reputation effects are measured by the 
insider’s direct involvement in internal governance such as membership on or being a 
chairperson of the audit, remuneration and nomination committees in the firm. 
 
Our measure of late reported trading differs from the method used by the ASX Markets 
Supervision (ASXMS) which measures reporting outside the required five day period. We 
compare each insider’s aggregate trades as reported to the Australian Securities Exchange 




the reported trades (as they occur) and the annual record of trading are taken to be incidences 
of late reported trades (net purchases or net sales) over the year. 
 
For S&P/ASX300 firms between 2007 and 2011, the rate of late reported trading is about six 
percent. Insiders who are older, with longer firm tenure and more stockholdings are more 
likely to engage in late reported trading. However governance positions tend to mitigate such 
behavior where insiders who are also members on committees are less likely to engage in late 
reported trading. The positions held by insiders (executive and non-executive directors) also 
affected these factors differently. 
 
This paper is organized as follows: the relevant literature and hypotheses are discussed in 
Section 2 while the data and method are presented in Section 3. Section 4 provides the results 
and the paper concludes with summary and conclusions in Section 5. 
 
2.  Relevant literature and hypotheses 
Individual characteristics and wealth indicators are predicted to influence the likelihood of 
late reported trading, viewed as unethical behavior in terms of both the utilitarianism and 
rights-based approaches while corporate governance roles and reputational concerns are 
expected to mitigate such behavior. In this section, the relevant literature around these various 
factors and the resulting hypotheses are presented. 
 
Late reporting and wealth considerations 
When an insider’s wealth is interconnected with firm value and performance, such individuals 
are expected to become less risk averse in their dealings with the firm, either through 




wealth considerations are measured via stock and flow measures being insider stockholdings 
and equity based compensation respectively. With both measures, the unethical behavior of 
insiders results in a benefit to the perpetrators only, to the detriment of other stockholders and 
also other insiders who report their trades in a timely manner. 
 
Risk averse insiders with equity holdings in their own firms may hold undiversified portfolios 
such that their wealth is strongly linked to the firm’s stock performance. While early studies 
such as Smith and Stulz (1985) suggest stock options as compensation due to the convexity of 
their payoff to offset insiders’ risk aversion, later studies including Carpenter (2000) find that 
stock options not only increase the sensitivity of insider’s wealth to changes in risk but also to 
changes in stock price. Therefore equity based compensation such as stock options can have 
an ambiguous effect of insider’s incentives to take on more risk. More recently, Armstrong, 
Larcker, Ormazabal and Taylor (2013) find that equity portfolios provide managers with 
incentives to misreport when they become less averse to equity risk. The concerns relating to 
equity based compensation apply more or even exclusively to executives in the firm rather 
than non-executives (independent directors). As such, executive directors are more likely to 
engage in unethical behavior from the utilitarian point of view due to their role in the firm and 
accompanying incentives. The role of non-executive directors is to actively monitor the 
behavior and decisions of top management to maximize returns to stockholders (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983) and their compensation is directly related to the need for monitoring and task 
difficulty. Indeed, Brick, Palmon and Wald (2006) find that director compensation is 
positively related to firm size, intangible assets and firm volatility. Non-executive directors 
receive less equity based compensation than executives (Brick et al, 2006; Li, Henry and 
Chou, 2011). Li et al (2011) report that while more than 37% of Australian executive directors 




although the options were not performance incentives. 
 
Firms with restrictions on the timing of insider trades pay a premium of 4% to 13% in total 
compensation compared to firms without such restrictions (Roulstone, 2003). These restricted 
firms also make greater use of bonus payments, stock options and restricted stock as 
compensation. Insiders in these restricted firms hold portfolios that increase their sensitivity 
to changes in price compared to other insiders. Given the restricted trading periods, they may 
choose to trade discreetly by delaying the disclosure of their trades to exploit the private 
information they hold at the time. Here equity based compensation is predicted to increase the 
individual’s incentive to engage in the unethical behavior of delaying the disclosure of 
trading. In addition, there also appears to be low likelihood of detection given no widely 
reported cases of prosecution of corporate insiders for late reporting trading.  
 
H1: With executive directors, there is a positive relation between equity related compensation 
and the likelihood to delay the reporting of trades. 
 
The conflict of interest between the managers and owners of the firm resulting from the 
separation of ownership from control can be traced back to Berle and Means (1932). 
Following on from this is the idea that investors with larger stakes have more incentives to 
monitor its activities, as the return from monitoring is sufficient to cover the associated 
monitoring costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) also 
advance the negative effect of managerial entrenchment where the larger the proportion of 
ownership held by a firm’s insiders, the more likely they are to pursue their own goals, to the 
detriment of other investors. Fidrmuc, Goergen and Renneboog (2006) suggest that the 




insiders themselves and other blockholders due to the effect of the latter’s monitoring on 
information asymmetry. In their examination of delayed reported insider trades under Form 5 
in US firms prior to the Sarbanes Oxley Act, Cheng, Nagar and Rajan (2007) report that 
institutional blockholders, particularly non-executive directors, display tendencies to prevent 
late disclosure of trades, particularly for trades that are opportunistic in nature. Even though 
institutional blockholders may monitor the trading and reporting activities of insiders, we 
predict that insiders with larger shareholdings may still exhibit opportunistic behavior by 
delaying the reporting of their trades. Similar to the previous hypothesis on equity based 
compensation, the likelihood of unethical behavior increases with personal financial 
incentives which are comparatively higher for executive directors. With their larger 
stockholdings compared to non-executive directors, to a large extent the predicted relationship 
relates more to executive directors in the firm. 
 
H2: With executive directors, there is a positive relation between insider stockholdings and the 
likelihood to delay the reporting of trades. 
 
 
Late reporting and risk taking behavior 
Peterson, Rhoads and Vaught (2001) study the ethical beliefs of business professionals and 
report a lower standard of beliefs in the younger age group. Vroom and Pahl (1971) find a 
negative relation between age and risk taking while according to MacCrimmon and Wehrung 
(1990), more mature executives are the most risk averse. In terms of the economic costs and 
benefits of white collar crime, Bhattacharya and Marshall (2012) predict that younger 
management have more to lose in terms of income, reputation and future prospects, and lower 




indicted for insider trading. Therefore when we view delayed reported trading as risk taking 
behavior, we expected that older insiders are less likely to engage in such activity due to their 
higher ethical beliefs. 
H3: There is a negative association between insider age and the likelihood of delayed 
reporting of trades. 
 
Insider experience and expertise within the firm is correlated with age although its effect on 
the likelihood of delayed reported trading is expected to be different. The expertise hypothesis 
argues that a director who has been with a firm over a longer term has greater experience, 
commitment and competence as a result of knowledge of the firm and its environment 
(Vafeas, 2002; Vance, 1983; Buchanan, 1974). However over extended periods of time, such 
benefits may be eroded (Katz, 1982) and this resulted in a call for term limits for directors 
(Lipton and Lorsch, 1992).  
 
According to Clinard (1983), senior executives who are more mobile and have short tenure 
are more likely to participate in illegal activities. However, Miller (1991) argues that long 
tenured executives become stale in the job and while they may not actively participate in 
fraudulent activities, they may passively consent to fraud. Similarly, insiders with longer 
tenure and experience in a particular firm are more likely to engage in late reported trading 
because they are aware of the of the low likelihood of detection. Coupled with better 
understanding of the firm when an idiosyncratic event occurs, these insiders better 
comprehend its implications on firm value, compared to newer insiders. As such, it is easier 
for them to identify the mispricing and act on such information. Subsequently, this may give 
rise to a higher tendency to engage in late reported trading. By the very nature of their role on 




in the firm. The likelihood of engaging in unethical behavior should also decrease. Beasley 
(1996) provides evidence supportive of this notion where the likelihood of financial statement 
fraud decreases as outside director ownership and tenure increase. 




Governance positions deterring late reported trading 
The reputation hypothesis (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983) suggests that vigilant 
managers create reputations as good monitors and attain additional seats on boards as a 
reward. In contrast, negligent managers encounter problems with their reputation capital and 
have reduced opportunities to serve on other boards. Much of the research has examined this 
issue from the viewpoint of CEOs and outside directors and the results are mixed. For 
example, Helland (2006) reports an increase in the number of other board seats held by 
outside directors in firms facing class action lawsuits while Fich and Shivdasani (2007) found 
an opposite result. 
 
We examine the reputation hypothesis using insider involvement in internal governance 
where insiders are appointed to oversight or monitoring positions such as membership on the 
main committees or chairperson of the main committees. Pool, Wang and Xie (2008) 
document that some insiders are held more responsible than others because of the 
predominant roles they play in the firm. For example, an insider who is also chairperson of a 
committee may be held responsible if there are disputes within the committee. Subsequently, 
this additional role may deter them from engaging in self-serving activities. We investigate 




committees are commonly found to be the ones of greatest influence and importance (Kesner 
1988). Limiting the measure to only three committees allows a better differentiation on the 
importance of the role of the chairperson. With a greater level of responsibility, the 
chairperson of the committee may be closely monitored by the board of directors. Such 
monitoring may deter them from opportunistic activities. 
H5a: Insiders who are also chairpersons on main committees are less likely to delay reporting 
their trades. 
H5b: Insiders who sit on main committees are less likely to delay reporting their trades. 
 
3.  Data and Research Method 
The initial sample consists of insiders on S&P/ASX300 firms during the five year period from 
January 2007 to December 2011. To be included in the sample, an insider must hold the same 
position within the firm for the entire financial year where any changes in position are verified 
on Connect4 BoardRoom. Data on insider trades were collected from Signal G 
announcements on Morningstar DatAnalysis Premium while annual insider trades were taken 
from annual reports on Connect4 Annual Reports. SIRCA’s Corporate Governance and 
Connect4 BoardRoom databases are the two main sources for insider characteristics and 
compensation. 
 
When any change in stockholding occurs, an insider is required to disclose the trade to the 
exchange via a Change in Director’s Interest notice (under s205G of Corporations Act and 
ASX Listing Rule 3.14). In addition, annual disclosure of insider holdings is also made in the 
firm’s annual report (under s300 of Corporations Act). For each insider, the beginning and 
end balance is given in the Annual Report together with details on transactions which have 




disclosure is made in terms of number of shares. Late reported trading is estimated by 
corroborating the purchase and sales figures as disclosed in the annual report with the 
reported trades announced to the exchange at the time of the trades1. When the annual report 
figure of net purchases (purchases less sales) differs from the reported net purchase figure 
aggregated over the financial year, this difference is deemed to be a case of late reported 
trading over the year, i.e. an annual net figure. We are unable to detect exactly when these 
trades occurred, beyond the knowledge that they had occurred sometime during the year. 
These net trades are censored at a minimum of 500 shares and a maximum of one million 
shares to ensure materiality of the effect and the removal of outliers that cannot be accounted 




A Probit regression is used to predict the likelihood of late reported trading on an insider firm 
year level. Late reported trading (LRT) is measured by a dichotomous variable where 1 
represents a case of late reported trading and 0 otherwise. The model is follows: 
LRT𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐺𝐸𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑗,𝑡+𝛽3𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖,𝑗,𝑡+𝛽4𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 +𝛽5𝐶𝐻𝐴𝐼𝑅𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 +
𝛽6𝑇𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑖,𝑗,𝑡+𝛽7𝐸𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖,𝑗,𝑡+𝛽8𝐷𝐻𝑂𝐿𝐷𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1+𝛽9𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 +
𝛽10𝑀𝐵𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1+𝛽11𝑀𝐾𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1+ 𝛽12𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡         (1) 
 
Factors predicted to affect the likelihood of late reported trading are in three groups: insider 
                                                 
1 The late reported trade metric is measured in number of shares. To ensure that stock splits are detected, the 
beginning and end balances of insider stockholdings (in terms of number of shares) are compared for each 
financial year. Furthermore, such close examination of the beginning and year end stockholding balances allows 
us to re-estimate net late reported trading each year such that any late reported trading in one financial year is 
not carried over into the next year. For each reported trade, particularly those conducted near the end of the 
financial year, an up to 15 trading day allowance is made for reporting of the trade. This is due to the s205G 
disclosure requirement allowing directors to report up to 14 days after the trade. 
2 The censoring at the lower limit of 500 shares resulted in the reduction of 120 cases while at the upper end, the 




personal characteristics, insider wealth and governance mechanisms. In the wealth group, 
insider wealth is proxied by total compensation received (TCOMP), the proportion of equity 
related compensation to total compensation (EQUITY) and insider stockholdings (DHOLD). 
The proxies for personal risk characteristics include gender (GENDER), age (AGE), and firm 
experience (EXP). The mitigating governance roles predicted to preserve insider reputation 
and reduce the likelihood of late reported trading are membership on main committees 
(COMM) and chairperson of main committee (CHAIR). These explanatory variables are as 
follows:  
TCOMP is total annual compensation paid to each insider; 
EQUITY is annual compensation paid in the form of equity including options and share 
purchase plans, scaled by TCOMP; 
DHOLD is the insider’ stockholdings at the end of previous financial year in number of 
shares, divided by total number of shares outstanding; 
GENDER is a dichotomous variable with a value of 1 for male insiders and 0 otherwise; 
AGE is the insider’s age  in years; 
EXP is the number of year the insider has been working in the firm; 
COMM is the number of committees the insider is a member of, including the audit, 
remuneration and nomination committees;  
COMMdum is a dichotomous variable with a value of 1 when an insider is a member of 
the audit, remuneration or nomination committee and 0 otherwise; 
CHAIR is a dichotomous variable with a value of 1 when the insider is a chairperson on 
any one of the main committees (audit, remuneration and nomination) and 0 otherwise.  
 
Four variables are included to control for firm performance, growth opportunities and size. 
Previous research has shown that the level of trading, specifically the levels of buying and 
selling by insiders are affected by these factors (Seyhun 1986; Lakonishok & Lee 2001; 
Rozeff and Zaman, 1998). ROA is measured as earnings before interest and tax divided by 
total assets while MB is the market to book ratio and accounts for the firm’s growth 




measured as the market value of equity and annual share turnover. 
 
4.  Results 
Table 1 provides frequency counts of the late reported trades by insider level. In Panel A, of 
the 5,274 insider firm years from 2007 to 2011, there were 313 cases of late reported trading. 
The highest rate of late reported trading is in 2007 (7.01% or 60 cases) while 2010 gives the 
lowest rate at 5.37% or 75 cases. The average rate over the five year period is 6%. In the 
breakdown between executive and non-executive directors, the rate of late reported trading is 
higher among the former (9.23%) compared to 5.05% for non-executive directors. 
 
In the breakdown by firms with late reported trading given in Panel B, it is apparent that late 
reported trading occurs in a small number of firms only. For example, in 2011, there are 153 
firms with no late reported trading, 29 firms with one case, 11 firms with 2 cases and one firm 
with five and six cases each of late reported trading. Panel C shows the frequency of late 
reported trading by insider. Of the 1,739 individual insiders in the sample, there are 1500 
(86.2%) insiders with no late reported trading. This suggests that the phenomenon is also only 
concentrated among a small proportion of insiders. Further, there are 187 directors with one 
case of late reported trading, 37 directors with two cases, nine directors with three cases, five 
directors with four cases and only one director with five cases of late reported trading over the 
sample period. 
 
<insert Table 1 about here> 
 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics classified by firms with and without late reported 




assets (ROA) and mean market to book ratio (MB) of 4.4% and 3.17 respectively. These 
figures are higher (4.6% and 3.54) though not significantly so, in firms with no late reported 
trading. Compared to firms without late reported trading, firms with late reported trading are 
larger, in terms of market capitalization and less liquid (lower share turnover). 
 
The sample is dominated by male insiders in both firms with and without late reported trading 
(93% and 92%). The former are also older in age and have more firm specific experience. The 
average insider in a late reported trading firm is 60 years of age with 9.4 years of firm 
experience and sits on 1.13 committees. He also trades more frequently than insiders in firms 
without late reported trading (0.84% vs. 57%). In terms of compensation, insiders in late 
reported trading firms receive more total compensation ($776,000 vs. $522,000), receives a 
higher proportion of equity based compensation (14.9% vs. 11.4%) and has higher 
stockholding (2.6% vs. 1.3%). 
 
<Insert Table 2 about here> 
 
Executive and non-executive directors play different roles within the firm and therefore are 
compensated differently. Table 3 presents an analysis based on this classification. Ninety 
seven percent of executive directors are male, compared to 90% for non-executive directors. 
Executive directors are younger (53.8 years vs. 60.3 years), have more firm specific 
experience (8.5 years vs. 6.7 years), receive more total compensation ($1.78 million vs. 
$170,647), receive more equity based compensation, (33.4% vs. 5.2% of total compensation) 
and have higher stockholdings (3.3% vs. 0.8%). The monitoring function expected of non-
executive directors is reflected in their committee membership where the average non-




and 39% of non-executive directors are chairs of main committees. Eighty five percent of 
non-executive directors receive no equity based compensation while for executive directors, 
the comparable figure is 22%. This reflects the way executive and non-executive directors are 
compensated within the firms they are involved with. 
 
<insert Table 3 about here> 
 
Due to the differences between executive directors and non-executive directors, correlation 
analysis was conducted separately and the results are provided in Table 4 Panel A for 
executive directors and Panel B for non-executive directors. From Panel A, the Pearson 
correlation analysis shows that director age is positively correlated with firm experience and 
director stockholdings and negatively with equity based compensation. Firm specific 
experience is also positively correlated with committee membership, total compensation and 
director stockholdings. However with non-executive directors, age is positively correlated 
with experience, committee membership and total compensation but negatively with equity 
based compensation and stockholdings. These differences in correlations again reflect the 
different roles and compensation packages of the director types within the firm. 
 
<insert Table 4 about here> 
 
Tetrachoric correlation analysis was also conducted for dichotomous variables, the results of 
which are given in Table 5. For executive directors as shown in Panel A, late reported trading 
is positively correlated with reported trading and committee membership. Reported trading is 
positively correlated with gender but negatively with the position of chair on committees and 




correlated with committee membership while there is a negative correlation between gender 
and reported trading and also between equity compensation and reported trading. 
 
<insert Table 5 about here> 
 
Probit regression results are given in Table 6. The dependent variable is late reported trading 
(LRT) and the independent variables are insider wealth, insider characteristics, governance 
factors and firm controls. In Model 1 with only firm controls (ROA, MB, MKTCAP and 
TURNOVER) included, the coefficient on TURNOVER is negative and significant at p < 
0.05. This suggests that late reporting trading is less likely in firms with high turnover, that is, 
the more liquid firms. The pseudo R2 is very low at 0.02%.  
 
Next, the explanatory variables are included. In Model 2, the coefficients on TRADING, 
AGE, EXP and DHOLD are positive and significant while the COMMdum coefficient is 
significantly negative. The likelihood of late reported trading increases with insider (reported) 
trading frequency, age, firm experience and ownership. That is, older insiders and those with 
experience within the firm and larger ownership stakes are more likely to risk such behavior. 
However, membership on one of the main committees curbs such unethical behavior. The 
likelihood of late reported trading is affected by the insider’s experience with the firm where 
knowledge of its operations and perhaps also of its weak controls encourage such behavior. 
Insiders with more of their wealth tied into the firm’s performance are also more likely to 
engage in this behavior to maintain or increase the value of their portfolios. They may feel 
encouraged to undertake late reported trading, a risk taking activity because the likelihood of 
discovery is low. However, when placed in positions of responsibility such as being executive 




they value their professional reputation in the market.  
 
Next, the analysis is run separately for executive and non-executive directors due to the roles 
they play and their compensation structure. In Model 3 for executive directors, the 
TRADING, AGE, EXP and MKTCAP coefficients are positive and significant at at least p < 
0.05. The financial incentives hypotheses, H1 for equity related compensation and H2 for 
equity ownership are not supported. Contrary to H3, older insiders are more likely to act 
unethically by delaying the reporting of their trades. Hypothesis H4 is the only hypothesis that 
is supported where it is predicted that insiders with longer firm tenure are more likely to 
engage in late reported trading.  
 
For non-executive directors in Model 4, the likelihood of late reported trading increases with 
experience (0.268, p < 0.05) though membership on the main committees reduces the 
likelihood of this unethical behavior. Insider ownership however provides an incentive for 
non-executive directors to engage in late reported trading because the likelihood of such 
behavior increases with their stockholding. 
 
To ensure the robustness of the main results, additional analyses are conducted. Late reported 
trading by insiders are rare events and when converted to binary dependent variables for 
probit or logit analysis, there are many more zeros (non-events) than events. In our sample, 
there are 313 events and 4961 non-events. To account for the unbalanced sample where the 
probability of rare events is underestimated (King and Zeng, 1999a), we run a rare events 






While differences in compensation level, compensation structure and ownership between 
executive and non-executive directors have been discussed, there is also variability based on 
size of firm. For example, the mean total compensation for non-executive directors in small 
firms is lower than in large firms ($109,587 vs. $263,986); the mean proportion of equity 
based compensation is higher (7.66% vs. 3.64%) while the level of ownership is also higher 
(1.51% vs.0.18%). With executive directors, the mean total compensation is higher in large 
firms ($3,706,278 vs. $823,588) and the proportion of equity compensation is also higher 
(44.82% vs. 26.54%). However, the mean ownership level is lower in large firms (1.72% vs. 
3.93%), due to the size of the firm. To account for these differences, the executive and non-
executive director probit regressions are re-estimated separately for small and large firms3. 
The results in Table 6 show that age and experience affect the likelihood of late reported 
trading by executive directors. The firm size breakdown indicates that while experience is still 
a factor in small firms, equity based compensation reduces the likelihood of late reported 
trading. In comparison, the level of total compensation increases the likelihood of unethical 
behavior by executive directors in large firms.4 In the non-executive director regressions, the 
level of stockholdings increases the likelihood of late reported trading among small firm 
directors while in large firms, older directors are more likely to late report and being a 
chairperson on the main committee mitigates such behavior. These additional analyses 
emphasize the importance of taking size differences into consideration when examining 
compensation and ownership among corporate insiders. 
 
The firm governance structures such as membership on main committees and position of 
chairperson on these committees appear to be effective in reducing the likelihood of unethical 
                                                 
3 Firms in the sample were allocated into size deciles based on market capitalisation where Decile 1 consists of 
the smallest firms and Decile 10 the largest firms. Small firms are defined as those belonging to Deciles 1, 2, 
and 3 while large firms belong in Deciles 8, 9 and 10. 




behavior primarily among independent directors. This is because of the monitoring roles they 
are expected to play within the firm. However, with the higher rates of late reported trading 
among executive directors, we consider one other factor which could affect such behavior. 
According to Beasley (1996), the likelihood of financial statement fraud increases with the 
number of outside directorships due to director busyness and therefore distraction from their 
monitoring responsibilities. However it is also possible that directors with outside 
directorships are more concerned with acting ethically to prevent any damage to their 
reputational capital. We rerun the probit regressions for executive directors and include the 
number of outside board appointments as an independent variable. However, the variable is 
not significant.  
 
<insert Table 6 here> 
 
5.  Summary and Conclusions 
This study investigates late reported trading by corporate insiders and considers how personal 
incentives, risk preferences and governance positions affect the individual’s decision to 
engage in such unethical activity. Specifically, personal incentives such as wealth proxies in 
the form of equity related compensation and insider stockholdings are considered together 
with risk factors such as age and firm tenure. We also ask the question: whether corporate 
governance positions held by insiders deter them from engaging in unethical behavior when 
they contemplate the effect of discovery on their reputation. That is, we test whether positions 
of responsibility and influence dissuade insiders from corporate wrongdoing. 
 
The ra t e  o f  l a t e  r ep or t ed  t r ad in g  i s  ap prox imate l y  6% over the 2007 to 2011 




insiders and those with longer tenure in the firm demonstrate a higher likelihood of late 
reported trading. Insiders whose wealth is linked to the firm in terms of their stockholdings 
are also more likely to delay the reporting of their trades. These findings indicate that 
insiders with longer tenure are not only more knowledgeable about firm processes and 
procedures; they are also more informed of the likelihood of non-discovery. Therefore, they 
are willing to take risks because their personal wealth is secured to the firm. That is, there is 
more entrenchment. However, being involved in firm governance deters insiders from late 
reported trading. Main committee members are less likely to engage in this activity, relative 
to their counterparts.  
 
Due the different roles they play within firms and the variation in compensation structures 
and ownership levels, we analyzed executive and non-executive directors separately. Older 
executive directors and those with more firm specific experience are more likely to engage 
in late reported trading. By comparison, non-executive directors who are also sit on main 
committees are less likely to engage in such unethical behavior. In fact, their ownership 
levels positively affect the likelihood of late reported trading, particularly in smaller firms.  
This is possibly due to the higher proportion of shares held by insiders in small and newly 
listed shares while in larger and more established firms, proportionally higher compensation 
is paid.  
 
Our findings support prior studies that have shown the importance of considering wealth and 
risk characteristics of insiders when investigating occurrences of unethical corporate behavior. 
When certain personal and firm characteristics are present, this creates a perfect storm for 
unethical behavior. Firms have the ability to avoid the storm by putting appropriate 
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Panel B: Breakdown of late reported trades by number per firm 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2007 137 29 10 1 2    
2008 162 27 4 4 2    
2009 153 39 5 1 1 1   
2010 176 40 6 2 1  1 1 
2011 153 29 11   1 1  
 
Panel C: Breakdown of late reported trades by number per insider 
 0 1 2 3 4 5   
Insiders 1500 187 37 9 5 1   
         




Table 1   Frequency of late reported trades: 2007 to 2011 
 
Panel A: Breakdown by years 
 Insider firm years Late reported trades Late reported trades:  
executive directors 
Late reported trades  
Non-executive directors 
2007 855 60 (7.01%) 24 (11.27%) 36 (5.60%) 
2008 983 55 (5.59%) 18 (7.82%) 37 (4.91%) 
2009 1009 61 (6.05%) 17 (7.69%) 44 (5.59%) 
2010 1396 75 (5.37%) 24 (7.76%) 51 (4.69%) 
2011 1031 62 (6.01%) 26 (11.60%) 36 (4.46%) 





Table 2   Descriptive statistics 
Variable N Mean SD P50 N Mean SD P50 t  Z  
  
Late reported trading firms 
 
No late reported trading firms 
    
ROA 313 0.044 0.174 0.066 4967 0.046 0.181 0.065 0.172  0.281  
MB 313 3.174 3.359 2.340 4967 3.538 5.120 2.290 1.792  0.591  
MKTCAP 313 11300 33000. 642 4967 6210 18900 984 -2.703 ** 2.181 ** 
TURNOVER 313 689.330 1428.826 243.078 4967 3385.230 61600.000 350.931 3.070 *** 3.924 *** 
GENDER 313 0.929   4947 0.917   -0.831    
AGE 196 60.056 7.692 60 3486 59.086 7.955 61 -1.715 * -1.193  
EXP 313 9.435 6.364 6 4967 6.989 4.930 8 -6.673 *** -7.105 *** 
COMM 313 1.128 1.064 1 4967 1.379 1.088 1 4.046 *** 3.969 *** 
COMMdum 313 0.623   4967 0.721   3.463 ***   
CHAIR 313 0.236   4967 0.309   2.945 ***   
TRADE 313 0.840   4967 0.568   -12.434 ***   
TCOMP 313 774,864 1,381,794 166,549 4967 522,350 1,173,736 207,000 -3.162 *** -3.468 *** 
EQUITY (%) 313 0.149 0.242 0 4967 0.114 0.225 0 -2.456 ** -3.429 *** 
NOEQUITY 313 0.620   4967 0.713   3.298 ***   
DHOLD 299 0.026 0.072 0.000 4672 0.013 0.053 0.001 -3.106 *** -5.777 *** 
DHOLDdum 299 0.896   4672 0.868   -1.524    
ROA is return on assets, MB is market to book ratio; MKTCAP is the market value of equity; TURNOVER is the firm annual stock 
turnover; TCOMP is total annual compensation paid to each insider EQUITY is annual  compensation paid in the form of equity 
including options and share purchase plans, scaled by TCOMP; NOEQUITY is a dichotomous variable with a value of 1 when an 
insider has no stockholdings and 0 otherwise; DHOLD is the insider’ stockholdings at the end of previous financial year in 
number of shares, divided by total number  o f  shares outstanding; DHOLDdum is a dichotomous variable with a value of 1 when 
the insider holds stock within the firm and 0 otherwise; GENDER is a dichotomous variable with a value of 1 for male insiders and 
0 otherwise; AGE is the insider’s age  in years; EXP is the number of year the insider has been working in the firm in the current 
position; COMM is the number of main committees the insider is a member of; COMMdum is a dichotomous variable with a value 
of 1 when an insider is a member of the main committee and 0 otherwise; CHAIR is a dichotomous variable with a value of 1 











    
GENDER 1197 0.976   4076 0.900   -8.473 ***   
AGE 684 53.789 7.823 54 2996 60.364 7.447 61 20.007 *** 20.176 *** 
EXP 1197 8.474 5.743 7 4076 6.747 4.771 6 -9.483 *** -10.005 *** 
COMM 1197 0.314 0.681 0 4076 1.674 0.988 2 54.344 *** 38.681 *** 
COMMdum 1197 0.209   4076 0.864   50.580 ***   
CHAIR 1197 0.013   4076 0.391   45.368 ***   
LRT 1197 0.091   4076 0.050   -4.561 ***   
TRADE 1197 0.673   4076 0.559   -7.265 ***   
TCOMP 1197 1,784,764 2,029,570 1,044,641 4076 170,647 162,592 132,408 -27.489 *** -46.58 *** 
EQUITY 1197 0.334 0.259 0.345 4076 0.052 0.168 0 -35.517 *** -43.126 *** 
NOEQUITY 1197 0.222   4076 0.850   47.357 ***   
DHOLD 1136 0.033 0.086 0.003 3829 0.008 0.038 0 -9.350 *** -24.651 *** 
DHOLDdum 1136 0.915   3829 0.857   -5.831 ***   
ROA is return on assets, MB is market to book ratio; MKTCAP is the market value of equity; TURNOVER is the firm annual stock 
turnover; TCOMP is total annual compensation paid to each insider EQUITY is annual  compensation paid in the form of equity 
including options and share purchase plans, scaled by TCOMP; NOEQUITY is a dichotomous variable with a value of 1 when an insider 
has no stockholdings and 0 otherwise; DHOLD is the insider’ stockholdings at the end of previous financial year in number of shares, 
divided by total number  o f  shares outstanding; DHOLDdum is a dichotomous variable with a value of 1 when the insider holds stock 
within the firm and 0 otherwise; GENDER is a dichotomous variable with a value of 1 for male insiders and 0 otherwise; AGE is the 
insider’s age  in years; EXP is the number of year the insider has been working in the firm in the current position; COMM is the 
number of main committees the insider is a member of; COMMdum is a dichotomous variable with a value of 1 when an insider is a 
member of the main committee and 0 otherwise; CHAIR is a dichotomous variable with a value of 1 when the insider is a chairperson 
on any one of the main committees and 0 otherwise; LRT is the likelihood of late reported trading and equal to 1 when there is late 







Table 4   Pearson and Spearman (above diagonal) correlations 
 
Panel A:  Executive directors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
ROA (1) 1 0.242 0.117 -0.153 0.020 0.195 0.036 -0.028 -0.128 0.062 
MB (2) 0.005 1 0.035 -0.132 -0.096 0.067 0.061 -0.168 0.060 0.196 
MKTCAP (3) 0.054 -0.031 1 0.548 0.073 0.170 -0.075 0.581 0.305 -0.334 
TURNOVER (4) -0.031 0.126 0.101 1 0.056 0.004 -0.030 0.459 0.246 -0.346 
AGE (5) 0.104 -0.096 0.040 0.057 1 0.256 0.012 -0.027 -0.171 0.003 
EXP (6) 0.206 -0.001 0.017 -0.062 0.345 1 0.069 0.006 -0.121 0.201 
COMM (7) 0.045 -0.012 -0.074 -0.068 -0.037 0.098 1 -0.156 -0.171 0.204 
TCOMP (8) 0.059 -0.104 0.428 0.156 0.050 0.086 -0.102 1 0.630 -0.333 
EQUITY (9) -0.122 0.013 0.200 0.095 -0.175 -0.126 -0.170 0.507 1 -0.213 
DHOLD (10) 0.081 0.141 -0.076 -0.074 0.083 0.101 0.118 -0.155 -0.189 1 
 
Panel B:  Non-executive directors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
ROA (1) 1 0.350 0.055 -0.162 0.047 0.083 0.097 -0.070 -0.180 0.023 
MB (2) 0.088 1 0.091 -0.171 -0.061 -0.019 0.019 -0.053 0.077 0.038 
MKTCAP (3) 0.048 -0.024 1 0.574 0.115 0.035 -0.095 0.640 0.033 -0.456 
TURNOVER (4) 0.026 -0.024 -0.009 1 0.110 -0.014 -0.066 0.494 0.023 -0.380 
AGE (5) 0.031 -0.079 0.064 0.012 1 0.273 0.050 0.162 0.005 0.056 
EXP (6) 0.093 -0.026 -0.002 -0.002 0.246 1 0.066 0.087 -0.093 0.270 
COMM (7) 0.054 -0.015 -0.061 -0.038 0.083 0.051 1 0.012 -0.034 0.083 
TCOMP (8) 0.004 -0.027 0.278 -0.006 0.111 0.105 0.016 1 0.179 -0.310 
EQUITY (9) -0.182 0.032 -0.028 -0.015 -0.065 -0.102 -0.021 0.333 1 -0.036 
DHOLD (10) -0.035 0.051 -0.065 -0.012 -0.094 0.074 -0.087 -0.075 -0.016 1 
ROA is return on assets, MB is market to book ratio; MKTCAP is the market value of equity; TURNOVER is the firm annual stock turnover; 




share purchase plans, scaled by TCOMP; NOEQUITY is a dichotomous variable with a value of 1 when an insider has no stockholdings and 0 
otherwise; DHOLD is the insider’ stockholdings at the end of previous financial year in number of shares, divided by total numb er  o f  
shares outstanding; DHOLDdum is a dichotomous variable with a value of 1 when the insider holds stock within the firm and 0 otherwise; 
GENDER is a dichotomous variable with a value of 1 for male insiders and 0 otherwise; AGE is the insider’s age  in years; EXP is the number 
of year the insider has been working in the firm in the current position; COMM is the number of main committees the insider is a member of; 
COMMdum is a dichotomous variable with a value of 1 when an insider is a member of the main committee and 0 otherwise; CHAIR is a 
dichotomous variable with a value of 1 when the insider is a chairperson on any one of the main committees and 0 otherwise; LRT is the 
likelihood of late reported trading and equal to 1 when there is late reported trading and 0 otherwise; TRADE is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 
when the insider has traded during the year and 0 otherwise; DHOLD is the insider’ stockholdings at the end of previous financial year in 






Table 5   Tetrachoric correlations 
 
Panel A:  Executive directors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
LRT (1) 1     
TRADING (2) 0.293 1    
GENDER (3) -0.116 0.226 1   
COMMdum (4) 0.135 -0.006 0.048 1  
CHAIR (5) -1.000 -0.234 1 1.000 1 
NOEQUITY (6) 0.03 -0.121 0.065 0.358 0.586 
 
Panel B:  Non-executive directors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
LRT (1) 1     
TRADING (2) 0.377 1    
GENDER (3) 0.032 -0.132 1   
COMMdum (4) -0.121 0.042 -0.160 1  
CHAIR (5) -0.037 -0.006 0.046 1.000 1 
NOEQUITY (6) -0.053 -0.430 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 
ROA is return on assets, MB is market to book ratio; MKTCAP is the market value of equity; TURNOVER is the firm annual stock turnover; TCOMP is total annual 
compensation paid to each insider EQUITY is annual  compensation paid in the form of equity including options and share purchase plans, scaled by TCOMP; NOEQUITY is 
a dichotomous variable with a value of 1 when an insider has no stockholdings and 0 otherwise; DHOLD is the insider’ stockholdings at the end of previous financial year 
in number of shares, divided by total number  o f  shares outstanding; DHOLDdum is a dichotomous variable with a value of 1 when the insider holds stock within the firm 
and 0 otherwise; GENDER is a dichotomous variable with a value of 1 for male insiders and 0 otherwise; AGE is the insider’s age  in years; EXP is the number of year the 
insider has been working in the firm in the current position; COMM is the number of main committees the insider is a member of; COMMdum is a dichotomous variable with 
a value of 1 when an insider is a member of the main committee and 0 otherwise; CHAIR is a dichotomous variable with a value of 1 when the insider is a chairperson on 
any one of the main committees and 0 otherwise; LRT is the likelihood of late reported trading and equal to 1 when there is late reported trading and 0 otherwise; TRADE is a 






Table 6  Late reported trading probit regressions 
 Coef z  Coef z  Coef z  Coef z  
 All directors All directors Executive directors Non-executive directors 
TRADING    0.606 4.15 *** 0.658 3.04 *** 0.615 3.89 *** 
GENDER    -0.111 -0.78  -0.559 -1.30  0.001 0.01  
lnAGE    0.707 2.07 ** 1.697 2.59 *** 0.274 0.67  
lnEXP    0.271 3.35 *** 0.302 2.14 ** 0.268 2.76 *** 
COMMdum    -0.284 -2.61 *** -0.092 -0.37  -0.314 -2.41 *** 
CHAIR    -0.022 -0.25     0.009 0.10  
lnTCOMP    0.008 0.30  0.037 0.39  0.003 0.07  
EQUITY    0.261 1.11  0.073 0.44  0.385 1.21  
lnDHOLD    1.384 1.73 * -0.696 -0.51  2.499 2.62 *** 
ROA -0.242 -1.39  -0.334 -1.44  -0.250 -0.61  -0.391 -1.35  
MB -0.010 -1.07  -0.007 -0.55  -0.020 -1.15  -0.001 -0.07  
lnMKTCAP 0.042 0.78  0.069 0.93  0.182 2.67 *** 0.054 0.08  
lnTURNOVER -0.116 -2.26 ** -0.046 -0.66  -0.146 -1.45  -0.019 -0.27  
Constant -1.082 -1.31  -6.322 -3.90 *** -10.638 -3.58 *** -5.064 -2.51 ** 
Year effects Included Included Included Included 
Industry effects Included Included Included Included 
N 3472 3472 630 2827 
Pseudo R2 0.021 0.087 0.140 0.083 
ROA is return on assets, MB is market to book ratio; MKTCAP is the market value of equity; TURNOVER is the firm annual stock turnover; TCOMP is total annual 
compensation paid to each insider EQUITY is annual  compensation paid in the form of equity including options and share purchase plans, scaled by TCOMP; NOEQUITY is 
a dichotomous variable with a value of 1 when an insider has no stockholdings and 0 otherwise; DHOLD is the insider’ stockholdings at the end of previous financial year 
in number of shares, divided by total number  o f  shares outstanding; DHOLDdum is a dichotomous variable with a value of 1 when the insider holds stock within the firm 
and 0 otherwise; GENDER is a dichotomous variable with a value of 1 for male insiders and 0 otherwise; AGE is the insider’s age  in years; EXP is the number of year the 
insider has been working in the firm in the current position; COMM is the number of main committees the insider is a member of; COMMdum is a dichotomous variable with 
a value of 1 when an insider is a member of the main committee and 0 otherwise; CHAIR is a dichotomous variable with a value of 1 when the insider is a chairperson on 
any one of the main committees and 0 otherwise; LRT is the likelihood of late reported trading and equal to 1 when there is late reported trading and 0 otherwise; TRADE is a 
dichotomous variable equal to 1 when the insider has traded during the year and 0 otherwise. Firm clustered standard errors are reported. 
